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W
hy can’t you eat horse or dog meat in a restaurant in California, a state
with a population that hails from all over the world, including some
places where such meals are appreciated? The answer is that many
Californians not only don’t wish to eat horses or dogs themselves, but ﬁnd it
repugnant that anyone else should do so, and they enacted this repugnance into
California law by referendum in 1998. Section 598 of the California Penal Code
states in part: “[H]orsemeat may not be offered for sale for human consumption.
No restaurant, cafe, or other public eating place may offer horsemeat for human
consumption.” The measure passed by a margin of 60 to 40 percent with over
4.6 million people voting for it (see http://vote98.ss.ca.gov/Returns/prop/
00.htm).
Notice that this law does not seek to protect the safety of consumers by govern-
ing the slaughter, sale, preparation, and labeling of animals used for food. It is
different from laws prohibiting the inhumane treatment of animals, like rules on
how farm animals can be raised or slaughtered, or laws prohibiting cockﬁghts, or
the recently established (and still contested) ban on selling foie gras in Chicago
restaurants (Ruethling, 2006). It is not illegal in California to kill horses; the
California law only outlaws such killing “if that person knows or should have known
that any part of that horse will be used for human consumption.” The prohibited
use is “human consumption,” so it apparently remains legal in California to buy and
sell pet food that contains horse meat (although the use of horse meat in pet food
has declined in the face of the demand in Europe for U.S. horse meat for human
consumption).
The repugnance of eating horses is not limited to California. On September 7,
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Senate, H.R. 503: “To . . . prohibit the shipping, transporting, moving, delivering,
receiving, possessing, purchasing, selling, or donation of horses and other equines
to be slaughtered for human consumption.” (That bill seems unlikely to pass into
law, however.)
Apparently, some kinds of transactions are repugnant in some times and places
and not in others. This essay examines repugnance and its consequences for what
transactions and markets we see. When my colleagues and I have helped design
markets and allocation procedures, we have often found that distaste for certain
kinds of transactions can be a real constraint on markets and how they are
designed, every bit as real as the constraints imposed by technology or by the
requirements of incentives and efﬁciency. In this essay, I’ll ﬁrst consider a wide
range of examples, including slavery and indentured servitude, lending money for
interest, price-gouging after disasters, selling pollution permits and life insurance,
and dwarf tossing.
This discussion will bring me naturally to the laws against the buying and
selling of kidneys for transplantation, which will connect this essay with the others
on organ transplantation in this issue. Because healthy people have two kidneys and
can remain healthy with only one, kidneys from living donors are now widely used
for kidney transplantation, the preferred treatment for end-stage renal disease. The
laws against buying or selling kidneys reﬂect a reasonably widespread repugnance,
and this repugnance may make it difﬁcult for arguments that focus only on the
gains from trade to make headway in changing these laws. That does not mean that
no gains from exchange can be realized; in fact some gains are beginning to be
realized in the kidney exchange programs that Tayfun So ¨nmez, Utku U ¨nver, and I
helped to design in New England and elsewhere. In the simplest form of kidney
exchange, a patient with a willing donor who has an incompatible blood type (or
who is incompatible for another reason) can exchange a kidney with another such
incompatible patient–donor pair. (That is, the pairs are matched so that the donor
from one pair is compatible with the patient from the other, and each patient
receives a kidney from the other patient’s donor.) This sort of “in kind” exchange
has gained acceptance in the transplant community.
1
More generally, this essay will explain why I think economists need to under-
stand better and engage more with the phenomenon of repugnant transactions.
Attitudes about the repugnance (or other kinds of inappropriateness) of transac-
tions shape whole markets, and therefore shape what choices people face.
1 See Roth, So ¨nmez, and U ¨ nver (2004, 2005a, b, forthcoming), Saidman, Roth, So ¨nmez, U ¨ nver, and
Delmonico (2006), and Roth, So ¨nmez, U ¨ nver, Delmonico, and Saidman (2006) for discussions of the
issues involved in organizing kidney exchange on an efﬁcient scale. A very small number of individual
kidney exchanges had been conducted before the issue of efﬁcient organization was raised, giving an
early indication that this kind of exchange did not arouse the repugnance associated with monetary
payments for organs.
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Table 1 lists some examples of transactions in which repugnance has estab-
lished important constraints, presently or at some time in the past. The arrow of
time points in both directions: some markets that are repugnant today, once were
not (or not sufﬁciently to serve as a binding constraint). Other markets are not
widely repugnant today, but once were.
Slavery is an obvious example of a market that is now repugnant and illegal
even in places like the United States where such markets were once openly
conducted. Slavery was forbidden by the 13
th amendment to the U.S. Constitution
in 1865, which states: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” Courts have
interpreted this amendment as also outlawing indentured servitude, and today we
ﬁnd servitude so repugnant that a person may not even sell him- or herself into
slavery or indentured servitude. But indentured servitude was once one of the
common ways for Europeans to buy passage across the Atlantic to America (Ga-
lenson, 1981).
Lending money for interest was once widely repugnant and no longer is (with
the important exception that Islamic law is commonly interpreted as prohibiting
it). State usury laws in the United States and Islamic banks in some countries are
Table 1
Markets In Which Some Transactions Are, or Were Once, Repugnant
Human remains
Cadavers for anatomical study, organ donation,
bone and tissue
Live donor organs (kidneys, livers)
Labor
Indentured servitude, slavery
Volunteer army, mercenary soldiers
Discrimination based on race, gender,
handicap, marital status, etc.
Reproduction and sex
Adoption




Polygamy, gay marriage, incest
Words, ideas, and art
Obscenity, profanity, and blasphemy
Cultural treasures, art, and antiquities
Risk



















Food, drink, and drugs
Horse and dog meat
Alcohol (Prohibition)
Marijuana and narcotics
Vote selling and bribery
Dwarf-tossing
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2 The changing repugnance of
debt and of involuntary servitude have even interacted in changes to bankruptcy
law. In colonial America and the early years of the Republic, insolvent debtors
could be imprisoned, or sentenced to indentured servitude (Coleman, 1974
[1999]). But as involuntary servitude became more repugnant and debts less
repugnant, bankruptcy laws were rewritten to be less punitive to debtors.
The examples in Table 1 and others I will discuss reﬂect that, even where there
may be willing suppliers and demanders of certain transactions, aversion to those
transactions by others may constrain or even prevent the transanctions. For many
of the examples in Table 1, “repugnance” or even “revulsion” is exactly the right
word for how the transactions are or were once regarded. For the rest, a milder
word might be more apt—some transactions may be called distasteful, inappropri-
ate, unfair, undigniﬁed, or unprofessional.
Of course, there may also be other reasons to object to markets that some
people ﬁnd repugnant, and so it may be difﬁcult to attribute only to repugnance
the limits on these markets. For example, while hiring mercenaries was once an
accepted way of dealing with military affairs (and although there has once again
been increasing use of private security ﬁrms to perform defensive military func-
tions), mercenaries have largely fallen out of favor. The declining use of merce-
naries is due not only to repugnance at the fact that mercenaries kill for pay, rather
than for state-sanctioned duty or patriotism. But that such repugnance plays a role
is strongly suggested by the lesser protection mercenaries receive under interna-
tional law. For example, Article 47 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conﬂicts states: “A mercenary shall not have the right to be a
combatant or a prisoner of war.”
How Repugnance Combines With Other Factors
Some markets are banned or limited for combinations of reasons that include
both repugnance and also concerns about negative externalities. For example,
limits on prostitution or pornography depend in part on revulsion at commercial-
izing sex. Fiske and Tetlock (1997) talk about “taboo tradeoffs between different
spheres of justice” to discuss why bringing to the market activities or goods that are
customarily provided in other settings, like within families, may seem inappropriate
or worse. But concern also arises about the negative effects pornography or
commercial sex may have on the quality of life in neighborhoods where it is sold.
2 Near the beginning of his essay “The Spirit of Capitalism,” Max Weber quotes Benjamin Franklin on
the virtues of responsible lending and borrowing, and near the end of the essay, Weber ([1905] 1930,
p. 74) asks, “Now, how could activity, which was at best ethically tolerated, turn into a calling in the sense
of Benjamin Franklin?” Hirschman (1977, p. 9) paraphrases Weber’s question as: “How did commercial,
banking, and similar money-making pursuits become honorable at some point in the modern age after
having stood condemned or despised as greed, love of lucre, and avarice for centuries past?” In this
journal, see Persky (2007) on the Jeremy Bentham/Adam Smith arguments about usury, and Kuran
(1995) on Islamic banks.
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between willing parties.
Bans on commerce involving material judged to be obscene may also involve
concerns about externalities, as in Federal Communications Commission regula-
tions regarding certain words forbidden on radio and television broadcasts, or
voluntary regulations concerning whether children can see certain movies; for
example, Fairman (2006) discusses the laws and jurisprudence concerning the
word “fuck.” But repugnance can be present even when externalities are minimal.
For example, in 1959 the U.S. Post Ofﬁce imposed a ban on sending copies of D. H.
Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover through the mail (this story and several related
obscenity trials are recounted in Rembar, 1968). Similarly, bans in various times and
places on profane language may primarily concern externalities, but bans on blasphe-
my—like banning the sale of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in a number of Islamic
countries—seem also to be aimed at limiting private consumption (and production).
Limits on the sale of alcohol and various drugs, and on gambling, may also be
complicated in this way. (The sale of alcohol was banned throughout the United
States from 1920 to 1933 by the 18th amendment to the Constitution, known as
“Prohibition,” which was repealed by the 21st amendment, although individual
states and counties still retain a variety of restrictions.) When addiction is an issue,
even apart from the negative externality imposed on third parties (through in-
creases in bankruptcy and crime, for example), we may question whether the
parties to the transaction are willing in the sense that economists normally mean
when we discuss voluntary transactions.
Some kinds of repugnance are also intermixed with concerns about providing
incentives for bad behavior. The very idea of life insurance (“You want to set a price
on your life, and then place a bet on your date of death?”) seems to have had to
overcome initial repugnance in the early 1800s (Zelizer, 1979). The incentive issue
was often addressed by “insurable interest” laws specifying who could be a beneﬁ-
ciary of life insurance. As discussed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. in a 1911
Supreme Court case: “A contract of insurance upon a life in which the insured has
no interest is a pure wager that gives the insured a sinister counter interest in
having the life come to an end” (Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 [1911]). Even today,
life insurance for small children raises questions about motives. The insurance
industry lobbies against Stranger (or Investor) Owned Life Insurance (SOLI) and
“viatical settlements,” which are third party markets and funds that purchase life
insurance policies from elderly or terminally ill patients who wish to realize the cash
value of their policies while still alive. The arguments against such funds often focus
on the repugnance of having life insurance held by an entity that proﬁts from
deaths (in contrast to insurance companies, which make money when their cus-
tomers continue living). Of course, sellers of annuities also proﬁt from untimely
deaths. To get a ﬂavor of the discussions about these issues, see Silverman (2005).
Repugnance to betting on life and death also shows up in other contexts. In
July 2003, a proposed U.S. government-funded “prediction market” for terrorism-
related events was scrapped amidst much publicity, with the Senate Minority Leader
(Tom Daschle) saying, “I can’t believe that anybody would seriously propose that
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thing very sick about it,” and adding that those responsible should be ﬁred. In this
discussion, there was also some concern that terrorists themselves shouldn’t be
encouraged to play such markets (CNN.com, 2003).
To clarify ideas about repugnance, it may be helpful to look at a relatively
uncomplicated case, in which little else besides repugnance seems to be at work.
Dwarf tossing seems like a market whose widespread banning involves no more
than simple repugnance.
Dwarf Tossing
Dwarf tossing is an activity in which a large person throws a small person. The
venue often is one in which alcohol is served. It is often a source of livelihood for
the small person, with the large person paying for the privilege. While dwarf-tossing
is legal in many places, it is sometimes banned by law. These bans suggest a concern
quite different from occupational health and safety regulations that might attempt
to regulate how to conduct such an event (for instance, by requiring the wearing of
helmets and kneepads). For example, the summary of the Ontario Dwarf Tossing
Ban Act of 2003 states: “The Bill bans dwarf tossing in Ontario and makes it an
offence to engage in dwarf tossing.”
The matter came before the United Nations Human Rights Committee after
the French Ministry of the Interior in 1991 issued a statement saying that “dwarf
tossing should be banned on the basis of, among other things, article 3 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.” After bans were subsequently enforced in some municipalities, a
French dwarf, who had been employed by a company called Socie ´te ´ Fun-
Productions, successfully sued in French courts to have the bans overturned.
However, the bans were upheld on appeal in 1995 by the French Council of State
on the grounds that “dwarf tossing . . . affronted human dignity.” The dwarf then
brought his complaint to the United Nations, asserting that he was the victim of a
discriminatory violation by France of his right to employment. A report from the
Ofﬁce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (2002) further
notes that he stated “that there is no work for dwarves in France and that his job
does not constitute an affront to human dignity since dignity consists in having a
job.” However the UN committee found in favor of France: “The Committee
considers that [France] has demonstrated . . . that the ban on dwarf tossing . . . did
not constitute an abusive measure but was necessary in order to protect public
order, which brings into play considerations of human dignity that are compatible
with the objectives of the Covenant.” Thus the UN committee, like the French
Council of State, essentially concluded that dwarf tossing was so repugnant that it
imposed a negative externality by diminishing human dignity, a public good.
Repugnance Is Hard To Predict
Repugnance, whether alone or in alliance with other objections, can impose
serious constraints on various transactions. However, predicting when repugnance
42 Journal of Economic Perspectiveswill play a decisive role is difﬁcult, because apparently similar activities and trans-
actions are often judged differently. For example, while dwarf tossing is repugnant
in many places, wife carrying, another sport that involves persons of disparate
stature, has North American and world championships. In wife carrying, large men
carrying small women (not necessarily their wives) race to complete an obstacle
course in the fastest time, with the prize traditionally including the “wife’s” weight
in beer. The website of the world championship in Finland is at http://www.
sonkajarvi.ﬁ/?deptid15136.
Many other examples of apparently similar activities have elicited very different
reactions regarding their repugnance.
The proposed prediction market for terrorist events met with vigorous denun-
ciation, but general prediction markets have thrived, including some that include
bets on various aspects of current events, as discussed by Wolfers and Zitsewitz
(2004) in this journal.
In 1990, the Clean Air Act was amended to allow trading of rights to pollute
through tradable emissions entitlements. In 1991, the World Bank issued a memo
under the signature of its then–chief economist Lawrence Summers, suggesting
that it would be efﬁcient for polluting industries to be located in low-income
countries. Both policies involve relocating pollution. Although some critics found
“selling a right to pollute” to be repugnant, the 1990 law passed as an efﬁciency-
enhancing measure with relatively little public controversy (Schmalensee, Joskow,
Ellerman, Montero, and Bailey, 1998). However, the World Bank memo set off a
ﬁrestorm of public controversy (Harvard Magazine, 2001). Similar controversies
have erupted around issues such as whether New York City can send its garbage to
landﬁlls in other states.
There are laws criminalizing kickbacks offered by vendors to purchasing
agents, and such behavior is viewed with repugnance. However, no legal and few
corporate restrictions exist on frequent ﬂier miles given to business travelers, who
book their ﬂights in their capacity as purchasing agents for their companies.
Frequent ﬂyer miles are not viewed as a repugnant kickback, but as an appropriate
reward.
There are laws against various forms of “price gouging,” and ticket scalping
remains illegal in many places. However, Ticketmaster has recently started auction-
ing some tickets just before the time of the event (Smith and Silver, 2006).
Payment to a birth mother for a child to whom she is genetically related is
widely regarded as repugnant, and is forbidden both internationally by the Hague
Convention on Intercountry Adoption and in the United States though the Inter-
country Adoption Act of 2000. However, largely unregulated markets have devel-
oped for many relatively new forms of reproductive technology, from markets for
sperm and eggs, to the hiring of surrogate mothers who have a fertilized egg
implanted and carry out the pregnancy of a child to whom they are genetically
unrelated (Spar, 2006).
Finally, the sale of food crops that have been modiﬁed by traditional methods
of cross breeding do not seem widely repugnant anywhere. However, food crops
genetically modiﬁed by recombinant DNA technology are not accepted nearly as
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genetically modiﬁed crops, listed at http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biotechnology/
gmfood/legisl_en.htm.
Cash Payments and Repugnance
One often-noted regularity is that some transactions that are not repugnant as
gifts and in-kind exchanges become repugnant when money is added. The histor-
ical repugnance to charging interest for loans seems to fall into this class as do
prohibitions on paying birth mothers of children put up for adoption; perhaps,
prostitution also falls into this class. That is, loans themselves and adoption and love
are widely regarded as good things when given freely, even when their commercial
counterparts are regarded in a negative way. Similarly, in Massachusetts and Cali-
fornia, it is legal to sell human eggs for fertilization but illegal to sell them for
research purposes, although it is legal to donate them for research (Associated
Press, January 20, 2007). And widespread outrage in Britain greeted the decision to
allow sailors recently released from captivity in Iran to sell their stories to the news
media: after two sailors had done so, the remaining sailors were no longer allowed
to receive money for interviews (Peck, 2007).
Offering money is often regarded as inappropriate even when not repugnant.
For example, dinner guests at your home may respond in-kind, by bringing wine or
inviting you to dinner in return, but they would likely not be invited back if they
offered to pay for their dinner. Sometimes the level of the price is regarded as
repugnant rather than the existence of a price: after a natural disaster it is often
regarded as acceptable to sell supplies at their pre-disaster price, but as repugnant
price-gouging to raise the price (for example, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler,
1986). Also, there may be resistance to charging for goods that have previously
been provided for free or at low cost, like water or the right to drive in cities during
rush hours.
Of course, sometimes laws or public outrage focus on monetary transactions
only because they are easier to ban than nonmonetary transactions. For example,
the supporters of the law that forbids restaurants from selling horsemeat in Cali-
fornia aren’t trying to preserve the sanctity of the family barbecue; they ﬁnd eating
horses repugnant, but regulation of restaurants is easier than passing laws about
what can be cooked at home.
Concerns about the monetization of transactions fall into three principal
classes. One concern is objectiﬁcation: that is, the fear that putting a price on certain
things and buying or selling them might move them into a class of impersonal
objects to which they should not belong. The sociology literature has shown a
longstanding interest in how the introduction of money changes many kinds of
social relationships and their meanings (as a starting point, see Simmel, 1990). A
second concern is that offering substantial monetary payments might be coercive,i n
the sense that it might leave some people, particularly the poor, open to exploitation
from which they deserve protection. A third concern, sometimes less clearly artic-
44 Journal of Economic Perspectivesulated, is that monetizing certain transactions that might not themselves be objec-
tionable may cause society to slide down a slippery slope to genuinely repugnant




Many people clearly regard monetary compensation for organ donation as
something that transforms a good deed into a bad one. In both Western Europe
and the United States, governments strongly encourage organ donation, but forbid
monetary payments to donors or their heirs. For example, Article 21 of the Council
of Europe’s (2002) Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomed-
icine, on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin states: “The human
body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to ﬁnancial gain.” However, the
European legislation does exempt from this prohibition compensation to donors
for expenses and loss of earnings. The U.S. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984
states: “[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive or
otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation.” This law also exempts payment of expenses directly incurred by
organ donors, like travel expenses.
The feeling that virtuous organ donations are transformed into immoral
commercial transactions by the introduction of monetary payments is clearly enun-
ciated in the writings and speeches of Pope John Paul II. In his 1998 encyclical
letter Evangelium Vitae (paragraph 86), the Pope mentions the donation of organs
as a “particularly praiseworthy example” of an action that builds “an authentic
culture of life.” But in an address to transplant surgeons in Rome, John Paul II
(2000) warned that “any procedure which tends to commercialize human organs or
to consider them as items of exchange or trade must be considered morally unaccept-
able, because to use the body as an ‘object’ is to violate the dignity of the human
person.” The Lutheran Church in America (1984) expresses a similar sentiment.
I note in passing that other religious traditions view the matter very differently.
The emerging Jewish consensus on live kidney donations, for example, is that
donation of organs is a good thing, and that under some circumstances, it would be
allowable to offer and accept compensation.
3 This opinion reﬂects the tremendous
3 While there is no central authority on the application of Jewish law to modern concerns such as
transplantation, the most authoritative opinions are contained in various “responsa” or answers to
particular questions by rabbis acting as legal “deciders” (poskim), whose authority arises from the respect
of their peers. The consensus on the matter of live kidney donation, for example, seems to be that live
donation is allowed (since it saves lives), but it is not required (since the donor becomes wounded and
takes some risk to his own life), and hence it falls into the category of things for which compensation
could be offered and accepted (unlike actions that are either forbidden or required). See, for example,
Eisenberg (2006), Grazi and Wolowelsky (2004), Kunin (2005), and Israeli (1997) who cite eminent
modern poskim such as Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and Rabbi Moshe Feinstein.
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets 45importance that Jewish law gives to saving a life, which can overturn many more
mundane prohibitions. For example, Avraham (2004, p. 271–2) reports the opin-
ion of the eminent Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach that someone who sells a
kidney with the intention of saving a life does a good deed “even if he would not
have donated his kidney only to save life.” But he goes on to note, “[I]n spite of all
that has been said above, it seems to me that it is the community that needs
soul-searching for allowing a person to reach such a depth of despair that he must
sell a kidney, either because of poverty, debts, or the inability to pay for a relative’s
medical expenses.”
I am less familiar with Islamic thought on the matter, but I surmise that it is in
some respects similar, since the Islamic Republic of Iran presently allows live kidney
donors to receive monetary payments (Bagheri, 2006; Ghods and Savaj, 2006).
Coercion
A different concern, quite common in the organ transplant literature and
elsewhere, is that money may be coercive, so that allowing kidneys to be sold would
allow the poor to be exploited. Even in the absence of money, transplant surgeons
are eager to avoid accepting organs from donors who may feel coerced, perhaps by
family pressure. Contract law in general holds that contracts may be voidable by the
courts in case of coercion due to, among other things, “undue inﬂuence” by parties
with special relationships (Farnsworth, 1990, section 4.20). (I am not aware, how-
ever, of any part of contract law that views excessive monetary compensation as a
source of coercion.) Interestingly, Ghods and Savaj (2006) express the view that the
availability of paid unrelated kidney donors in Iran has reduced the coercion of
unpaid related donors.
In a recent exchange, Gaston, Danovitch, Epstein, Kahn, Matas, and Schnitzler
(2006) proposed in the American Journal of Transplantation that it might be possible
to avoid the repugnance of outright payments for kidneys, while “limiting ﬁnancial
disincentives in live organ donation,” by providing a ﬁxed package of beneﬁts to
kidney donors, including insurance, compensation for expenses and lost wages,
and a ﬁxed payment (they suggest $5,000) to compensate donors for pain and
suffering. In response, in an editorial in the same issue of the journal, Fox (2006)
writes of the “moral cost of living donor inducements.” Fox argues, “While the
proposed beneﬁt may not be a deciding factor to the CEO of a Fortune 500
company, to someone earning only minimum wage, the compensation may repre-
sent several months’ pay. To deny the potential of this proposal to ‘coerce an
otherwise unwarranted decision to donate’ reﬂects the folly of the privileged, not
the reality of the poor.” Similarly, Kahn and Delmonico (2004) summarize their
opposition to buying and selling organs by saying, “It is an unethical approach to
shift the tragedy from those waiting for organs to those exploited into selling
them.”
This viewpoint is not restricted to the transplant community. The National
Bioethics Advisory Commission (2001), writes that paying subjects to participate in
46 Journal of Economic Perspectivesmedical experiments may be coercive.
4 They go on to say that, if an institutional
review board is concerned that the subjects in an experiment may be economically
disadvantaged, it may require that the researchers reduce the payments they make
to participants. The concern here is not to protect the research design against the
possibility that rich and poor participants might self-select differently into the
experiment for a given participation fee, but rather to protect low-income partic-
ipants from being faced with such a high participation fee that they would feel
coerced to participate. Baron (2006) offers a critical view of this line of argument.
Slippery Slope
Concern that monetizing some transactions might lead to other changes seems
to lurk beneath the more explicit concerns. Some critics fear a commercial dystopia
in which kidney sales would enter into contracts: for example, as collateral, or as
payment for other medical services, or to repay debts, or as means tests for
eligibility for social services and ﬁnancial aid. Such scenarios have found their way
into ﬁction and movies also (Ishiguro, 2005; Picoult, 2004; Farmer, 2002).
This concern is not altogether different from concerns about how legalizing
certain kinds of voluntary transactions may change the terms of trade so as to
disadvantage those who don’t wish to participate in them. In this journal, Basu
(2003) uses sexual harassment as an example and argues that legalizing labor
contracts that allowed sexual harassment would put workers who did not wish to be
party to such contracts at a disadvantage relative to the status quo in which such
contracts are illegal. Similarly, for example, bans on polygamy might be understood
as outlawing certain kinds of competition that would disadvantage some men and
some women relative to the monogamous status quo, even while allowing others to
engage in welfare-improving transactions.
Some (but by no means all) of the opposition to monetary compensation for
deceased donor organs seems also to be of the slippery slope variety, with the
concern being that it might pave the way for live organ sales. Accounts of black
markets for kidney transplants lead to concerns about whether legal markets would
inevitably be similar. In this connection, Scheper-Hughes (2003, p. 1645) summa-
rizes the black market experience as follows: “In general, the circulation of kidneys
follows established routes of capital from South to North, from East to West, from
poorer to more afﬂuent bodies, from black and brown bodies to white ones, and
from female to male or from poor, low status men to more afﬂuent men.” She
concludes (p. 1648): “The division of the world into organ buyers and organ sellers
is a medical, social, and moral tragedy of immense and not yet fully recognized
proportions.”
A related concern is that monetary markets might crowd out altruistic giving
and that this might both reduce the supply of transplantable kidneys (Howard, this
issue; Institute of Medicine, 2006) and harm other characteristics of the organ
4 In contrast, experimental economists often think that paying subjects in economic experiments, based
on their performance, is an essential element in creating an economic environment in the laboratory in
which the experimenter can exercise some control over subjects’ preferences.
Alvin E. Roth 47transplantation process. For example, Danovitch and Leichtman (2006) worry that
monetary markets could reduce the incidence of deceased donation, which sup-
plies not only kidneys but other organs as well. A related literature in economics
and psychology is concerned with the loss of intrinsic motivation that might
accompany the introduction of monetary payments (for example, Gneezy and
Rustichini, 2000).
The medical literature encompasses broad views on these subjects and also
contains arguments in reply. For example, Hippen (2005) notes that regulated
legal markets might be quite different from illegal ones, and that similar slippery
slope fears were expressed about allowing live kidney donations from unrelated
donors, but that unrelated donors are now a substantial percentage of all donors.
Matas and Schnitzler (2004) argue that allowing kidney sales would be socially cost
effective. (Matas is the current president of the American Society of Transplant
Surgeons.)
Other Sources of Repugnance Toward Paying For Live Donor Kidneys
Although I have argued that the repugnance felt with regard to kidney sales
shares characteristics with repugnance for the monetization of other kinds of
transactions, the case of kidneys may also have some unique features.
For example, taking a kidney from a healthy donor holds little appeal to
surgeons trained in the Hippocratic tradition of “ﬁrst, do no harm.” While live
donor kidney transplants save lives, it is not the life of the donor that is being saved.
A surgeon who is already overcoming some distaste for performing a nephrectomy
(kidney removal) on a healthy person may ﬁnd the distaste more difﬁcult to
overcome if he views himself as facilitating a commercial transaction. However
surgeons may not (or may no longer) be the primary locus of repugnance to kidney
sales. In an informal poll following a debate on the subject at a recent meeting of
the American Society of Transplant Surgeons, a majority of those polled expressed
a willingness to contemplate a trial or demonstration project involving compensa-
tion for organ donors (personal communication, Arthur Matas, 1/27/07).
Overall, Boulware, Troll, Wang, and Powe (2006) report on the basis of a
telephone survey of randomly selected households: “The U.S. public is not gener-
ally supportive of incentives for DD [deceased organ donation], but is supportive of
limited incentives for LD [live donation]. Racial/ethnic minorities are more sup-
portive than Whites of some incentives. Persons with low income may be more
accepting of certain monetary incentives.”
Historical Perspective
To put the debate about organ donation into some historical context, consider
the case of cadavers. When the British medical journal The Lancet published its ﬁrst
volume in 1824, its pages reﬂected a concern that too few cadavers were available
for anatomy classes. The main source of cadavers was an illegal black market
supplied by so-called “resurrection men,” and an editorial by that name opens with
the news that a reliable resurrection man had recently been arrested and sen-
tenced. The editorial goes on to suggest—in an early observation that how issues
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only allowing the bodies of executed murderers to be used for anatomy studies
“tends to keep up . . . the prejudice which is at present so strong against the
obtaining of bodies for dissection” (Lancet, 1824).
The situation has changed, slowly but profoundly. In Britain, the Anatomy
Act of 1832 considerably expanded the source of legal cadavers for dissection.
Today, the “Bodyworlds” exhibits that have been touring museums worldwide
feature partially dissected cadavers in artful poses. Such exhibits do arouse some
repugnance, although not at the level that prevents the company from obtain-
ing cadavers, or the shows from attracting large audiences (http://www.
bodyworlds.com; Barboza, 2006). There are also today legal, regulated inter-
national markets for various storable transplantable cadaver tissues (for
example, bones), that can be used in surgical procedures such as hip replace-
ments (Mahoney, 2000). Opponents of regulated markets for organs will not be
reassured: there have been some notable abuses in the market for cadaver
tissues, including the widely publicized scandal (and subsequent prosecutions)
associated with the fraudulent sale of some of the body parts of Alistair Cooke,
host of the television show “Masterpiece Theater,” who died of cancer at the age
of 95. Bone (2006) discusses how the family authorization to harvest Cooke’s
body parts was falsiﬁed, and so was Cooke’s age and cause of death, thus
interfering with medical decision making on appropriate use of body parts (see
also Howley, 2007).
Economists’ Voices in the Debate About Organ Sales
Sandel (2005) begins this way: “My topic tonight is ‘The Moral Limits of
Markets.’ My question is: Are there some things that should not be bought and sold,
and, if so, why?” His talk was introduced by Stanley Hoffmann, who wrote: “The
topic falls a bit between the cracks of business school professors, who often hate to
raise ethical problems, and economists, who don’t always know what ethical prob-
lems are!” While Hoffman’s jibe overstates the case, it does seem true that when
confronted with repugnance toward a market transaction, economists often
respond as if a sufﬁciently clear argument focused on the welfare gains due to trade
will overcome that repugnance.
Becker and Elias in this issue present many of the arguments with which
economists and others often respond to concerns over the repugnance of paying
live kidney donors. The claim that organ sales “objectify” people is met by noting
that in labor markets generally, poorer workers tend to take more dangerous and
less pleasant jobs in return for wages, and that we mostly think they do not diminish
their humanity by doing so. The response to arguments about “coercion” is typically
that voluntary transactions increase welfare of both the seller and the buyer, if the
transaction is truly voluntary. The response to “slippery slope” arguments is that
markets can be regulated if necessary. Sometimes these arguments are supple-
mented by the observation that organ donation itself, even with a ban on monetary
payments, could be criticized with some of the same objections made to organ sales.
For references to both sides of the debate, particularly in the medical literature, see
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(2004).
In making such arguments, the role of repugnance per se is often regarded as
a side issue. For example, Radcliffe-Richards et al. (1998) conclude their “case for
allowing kidney sales” with the following statement: “The weakness of the familiar
arguments [against kidney sales] suggests that they are attempts to justify the deep
feelings of repugnance which are the real driving force of prohibition, and feelings
of repugnance among the rich and healthy, no matter how strongly felt, cannot
justify removing the only hope of the destitute and dying. This is why we conclude
that the issue should be considered again, and with scrupulous impartiality.”
Some discussion has focused on thinking about how the worst abuses of
unregulated markets could be reduced by regulations. Such regulations might
include restrictions on compensation (Gaston, Danovitch, Epstein, Kahn, Matas,
and Schnitzler, 2006); allowing outright purchases but only by a single authorized
governmental buyer (Satel, 2006); requiring an above-market-clearing price (that
might be bundled with insurance or annuities); mandatory standards for the health
and postoperative care of donors; or perhaps bans on international trade (since the
thought of rich Americans importing kidneys from the third world seems to arouse
a repugnance distinct from that toward the kidney sales themselves). Of course,
how many new kidneys would be elicited at what price depends on whether the
market would be international, and how perceptions of repugnance (and not just
of risk) would inﬂuence the willingness to sell.
These arguments against banning organ sales leave many opponents unper-
suaded. For example, Harmon and Delmonico (2006) write: “The Transplantation
Society, the American Society of Transplantation, the American Society of Trans-
plant Surgeons, the European Union, Eurotransplant, the National Kidney Foun-
dation, the World Health Organization, and more have long recognized the
unethical realities regarding a regulated market, and each organization has con-
sistently opposed it.”
Readers who want to test their own potential repugnance to voluntary trans-
actions by well-informed, consenting adults might note that most of the arguments
designed to disarm repugnance to legalizing the sale of a kidney would also, in
principle, apply to a live donor who was willing, for a sufﬁciently high price, to sell
an eye, an arm, a leg—or a heart.
Market Design When Repugnance Matters
My colleagues and I have encountered resistance to certain kinds of transac-
tions when helping design both markets that involve monetary transactions, like
labor markets, and allocation procedures that do not, like allocating public school
places to children. Our experience suggests that ideas about the inappropriateness
of certain kinds of transactions—even when this inappropriateness falls short of
outright repugnance—can constrain market design.
Many labor markets for entry-level professionals have suffered market failures
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Typically in these markets, the hiring date moves further and further in advance of
employment, with ﬁrms making potential employees “exploding offers” with the
effect of not allowing employees the opportunity to consider other opportunities
before responding (Roth and Xing, 1994). This kind of unraveling occurs in a
variety of markets, from markets for new doctors and lawyers, to markets for teams
participating in college football bowls. Often this leads to clearly inefﬁcient out-
comes. In Niederle and Roth (2003), my coauthor and I show how this unraveling
of appointment dates caused the markets for new gastroenterologists to fragment
from a national market into much more local markets. In Freche ´tte, Roth, and
U ¨nver (2007), my coauthors and I show how better matchups at bowl games
increase the television viewership of the games. Sometimes there is an opportunity
to correct the market failures associated with unraveling and exploding offers by
creating clearinghouses that will provide a thick market (for example, Roth, 1984).
Clearinghouses are also sometimes employed to ﬁx market failures due to conges-
tion (Roth and Xing, 1997; Abdulkadirog ˇlu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005).
When Muriel Niederle and I were asked to help implement a clearinghouse for
the entry-level market for gastroenterologists along the lines of the medical match
for new medical graduates (Roth and Peranson, 1999), one issue was whether the
gastroenterology professional societies would adopt a resolution that would allow
applicants who had accepted early exploding offers, well before the date for the
clearinghouse to operate, to decline these offers subsequently and participate in
the clearinghouse. Many gastroenterologists felt that it would be unprofessional for
future gastroenterologists to begin their careers by ﬁrst accepting an offer and
subsequently declining it. But it was also widely felt that early exploding offers were
inappropriate and anticompetitive, and should be discouraged. After much discus-
sion, the four gastroenterology professional organizations became convinced that
allowing applicants to change their minds about exploding offers would make such
offers unproﬁtable, so that in the future, very few such offers would be made and
subsequently declined. This prediction ultimately was fulﬁlled (Niederle, Proctor,
and Roth, 2006; Niederle and Roth, 2006). The relevance for the present essay is
that much of the debate focused on the propriety of how offers should be made, and
accepted or rejected.
Discussions about propriety are not always decided on the basis of welfare. My
colleagues and I have encountered this at several junctures in designing public
school choice allocation procedures (for which monetary payments would be
widely regarded as inappropriate). In Boston, one of the ways that children are
assigned priority to enter particular schools is if they have an older sibling already
attending that school. We proposed two alternative designs for a strategy-proof
allocation procedure, one of which was adopted (Abdulkadirog ˇlu, Pathak, Roth,
and So ¨nmez, 2005). The procedure that was rejected would have produced welfare
gains in cases in which two students each would have preferred to go to the school
for which the other had a high priority. But this proposal was rejected because it
would have allowed the “trading” of sibling priorities, which was felt to be an
inappropriate transaction, because sibling priorities in particular shouldn’t be trad-
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children in the same school if that was their preference. Instead, Boston adopted
a clearinghouse built along the lines of the clearinghouses designed for medical
matches, a modiﬁed version of which was also adapted for matching students to
high schools in New York City (Abulkadirog ˇlu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005).
This brings me back to kidney exchange. My point in the present essay is
simply that, unlike the buying and selling of kidneys, in-kind exchanges have not
aroused a repugnant reaction. In Roth, So ¨nmez, U ¨nver, Delmonico, and Saidman
(2006), my coauthors and I reported the success of a novel kind of exchange in
New England. This article appeared, without any negative reaction, in the same
issue of the American Journal of Transplantation as the Gaston, Danovitch, Epstein,
Kahn, Matas, and Schnitzler (2006) proposal for modest payments and the Fox
(2006) editorial reply that that proposal was repugnant. In fact, legislation has
passed Congress to amend the National Organ Transplant Act to endorse kidney
exchange explicitly: the Living Kidney Organ Donation Clariﬁcation Act of 2007
passed in the Senate (S. 487) on February 15, 2007, and it passed in the House of
Representatives (H.R. 710) on March 7, 2007 (although the law has yet to be
enacted).
Kidney exchange by itself won’t solve the general shortage of transplantable
kidneys. In-kind kidney exchange directly helps only people who already have a
willing live donor (although more complex kinds of exchanges can also directly
help some patients on the waiting list for a deceased-donor kidney, and every live
donor transplant helps reduce the demand for scarce deceased donor kidneys).
However, if we can successfully organize kidney exchange on a national scale, we
might be able to do several thousand more transplants per year (instead of the
dozens to which the local and regional exchanges are still presently limited). The
increase would come both from extending the possibility of exchange to all regions
of the country, and from the additional exchanges arising as a result of a thicker
market consisting of more available patient–donor pairs. Whatever other policies
might be adopted in the more distant future to beneﬁt patients who need trans-
plants, or to reduce the incidence of kidney disease, kidney exchange offers real
gains that have proved to be achievable.
Conclusions
Repugnance can be a real constraint on markets. Almost whenever I have been
involved in practical market design, the question of whether certain kinds of
transactions may be inappropriate has come up for discussion.
5
5 One notable exception has been in my role as chair of the American Economic Association’s Ad Hoc
Committee on the Job Market, which has implemented several changes in the market for new Ph.D.
economists. As nearly as I can recall, our discussions have focused only on efﬁciency and incentives.
(The other members of that committee are John Cawley, Philip Levine, Muriel Niederle, and John
Siegfried.)
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isn’t sometimes deployed for strategic purposes by self-interested parties to recruit
allies who would not respond to a clear appeal to narrower motives such as rent
seeking. The opposition of insurance companies to viatical settlements might be an
example. Experiments in the laboratory show clearly how arguments about unfair-
ness can be deployed in a self-interested way, with agents’ perception of what is fair
closely correlated with their interests (for example, Roth and Murnighan, 1982).
But the real repugnance that some people feel toward some transactions means
that economists interested in proposing and designing markets must take this
repugnance into account.
The debate over whether the sale of kidneys should be legalized is just one
example among many in which repugnance plays a large role. Because of its
importance, the arguments on both sides have been presented with particular force
and clarity. All parties agree it is urgently desirable to cure patients with end-stage
renal disease, and that the best current treatment is organ transplantation, partic-
ularly from live donors. The current situation in the United States involves long wait
times for deceased donor kidneys by tens of thousands of patients without a live
donor; difﬁcult and costly palliative treatment by dialysis; and thousands of deaths
annually while waiting. But opponents of organ sales ﬁnd the prospect of a market
for organs so repugnant as to be worse than the current situation. Proponents of
markets are correspondingly frustrated at the failure to adopt what they see as a
feasible solution that could be implemented quickly.
One way of seeing the role that repugnance plays in this debate is to compare
it to a difﬁcult technological barrier. If the technological barriers could be over-
come that currently prevent, say, transplanting pig kidneys into human patients,
such “xenotransplants” would also end the kidney shortage. But no one supposes
that this solution can be implemented quickly, because some technological barriers
cannot be overcome quickly, if at all. I’ve argued in this essay that repugnance is
similar to technological barriers in this respect: markets that we can envision may
nevertheless not be easily achievable. I would not like to guess whether repeal of the
widespread laws against kidney sales is likely to happen more quickly than the
advances in xenotranplantation, or artiﬁcial kidneys, or other medical break-
throughs that would end the shortage of kidneys.
Of course, there can also be “technological” developments in the law. For
example, Volokh (forthcoming) endorses a “medical right to self-defense,” that
would give a person dying of end-stage renal disease the right to pursue all
reasonable avenues to preserve their life, including purchasing a kidney. If this
argument or one like it makes headway, the courts might end bans on organ sales.
Popular repugnance often affects courts differently than legislatures; for example,
the ban on gay marriage was lifted in Massachusetts by a court interpreting the state
constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, not by new legislation. The Massa-
chusetts court decision is an example in which a ban based on a repugnance that
had survived since at least Biblical antiquity was ended quite suddenly, although
repugnance-inspired political battles on the issue continue.
The persistence of repugnance in many markets doesn’t mean that economists
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tradeoffs, and costs and beneﬁts. But neither should economists expect such
arguments to win every debate immediately. Being aware of the sources of repug-
nance can only help make such discussions more productive, not least because it
can help separate the issues that are fundamentally empirical—like the degree of
crowding out of altruistic donations that might result from different incentive
schemes compared to how much new supply might be produced—from areas of
disagreement that are not primarily empirical.
Just as economists and other proponents of legalizing kidney sales may not
always take repugnance with sufﬁcient seriousness, opponents of such sales often
fail to directly address the costs of the current kidney shortage that are borne
directly by kidney patients, and indirectly by society as a whole. Although econo-
mists see very few tradeoffs as completely taboo, noneconomists often decline to
discuss tradeoffs at all, preferring to focus on the repugnance of transactions like
organ sales. Advocates of well-regulated markets for organ transplants could more
clearly address the concern that markets are hard to regulate perfectly and that at
least some repugnant transactions would likely slip through even the best regula-
tory barriers. Opponents could better engage the question of whether it is possible
that a carefully regulated market with some inevitable abuses would, nevertheless,
be an improvement over current conditions. In this view, the current situation can
be viewed as a regulated market with the only legal price being zero, which makes
it difﬁcult to prevent unregulated transactions on international black markets (for
example, see the account in Morais, 2007).
Discussion itself may change some views on repugnance (Baron and Leshner,
2000)—in some cases by reducing visceral repugnance and in others by reﬁning it.
A participant in the discussion of a draft of this paper by the Chicago Transplant
Ethics Consortium (personal communication, Jason Snyder, 1/29/2007) noted: “I
think that the visceral response that almost everyone has to the notion of a market
for organs, what they feel the ﬁrst 10 seconds after hearing about such a market, is
a signiﬁcant sense of repugnance. According to [the previous discussion], a few
years ago most people in the transplant community felt this way. However it appears
that there is a growing divergence of opinion on this topic in the transplant
community. Essentially what I think is happening is that the more people carefully
think about these issues, the more they get beyond the initial yuck factor. Some go
toward the pro-market side, and others stay on the anti-market side for reasons that
go deeper than the ﬁrst visceral response.”
No one can contemplate the costs to the sick and dying without sharing the
concern for a solution to the shortage of transplantable organs. The questions are,
what kinds of solution are feasible and desirable, how to get from here to there, on
what time scale, with what costs to whom, and what to do in the meantime?
y I have had helpful correspondence and conversations with Michael Abecassis, Nava Ashraf,
George Baker, Jon Baron, Greg Barron, Max Bazerman, Eric Budish, Frank Delmonico, Drew
Fudenberg, Jerry Green, Ben Greiner, Rakesh Khurana, Steve Leider, Arthur Matas, Eva
Myersson Milgrom, Muriel Niederle, Doug Penrod, Michael Rees, Susan Saidman, Dov
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